BP 22 imposes the penalty of imprisonment of not less than 30 days but not more than 1 year OR a fine of not less than but not more tan double the amount of the check, which fine shall in no case exceed P200,000, OR both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. In the case of Eduardo Vaca vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court modified the sentence imposed by deleting the penalty of imprisonment and imposing only the penalty of fine in an amount double the amount of the check. In justification thereof, the Court said:

Petitioner are first-time offenders. They are Filipino entrepreneurs who presumably contribute to the national economy.  Apparently, they brought this appeal, believing in all good faith, although mistakenly that they had not committed a violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Other wise they could simply have accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation to evade a prison term.  It would best serve the ends of criminal justice if in fixing the penalty within the range of discretion allowed by §1, par. 1, the same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observe, namely, that of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation f personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection f the social order.  In this case we believe that a fine in an amount equal to double the amount of the check involved is an appropriate penalty to impose on each of the petitioners.

In the subsequent case of Rosa Lim vs. People of the Philippines, the Supreme Court also deleted the penalty of imprisonment and sentenced the drawer of the bounced check to the maximum of the fine allowed by B.P. Blg. 22, i.e., P200,000, and concluded that “such would best serve the ends of criminal justice.”

Due to the confusion caused by the circular, the Supreme Court issued another circular clarifying that the clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22. To summarize:

1. Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violations of B.P. Blg. 22;

2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice;

3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.

In other words, the circular establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions of B.P. 22, such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine along should be considered as the more appropriate penalty.